Information Security and Cyber Incidents in Israel: Legal Duties, Reporting and Liability

A ransomware attack can disable a computer system without extracting a single file. Unauthorized access to an employee’s account can expose a customer database even when the systems themselves are not damaged. Both situations require a technical response, but the legal obligations are not necessarily the same. They depend on the type of information affected, the security level applicable to the database, who is legally responsible and what happened to the information.

Information security and cyber incidents lie at the intersection of Israeli computer and internet law, privacy law and commercial law. The legal obligation to protect personal information exists before an attack occurs, while protection of source code, business information and operational systems may arise under contracts and other laws. Following an incident, separate decisions are needed on containment, preservation of evidence, regulatory reporting, notification of customers and liability for losses. These distinctions are relevant to international businesses operating in Israel and to foreign counsel coordinating the Israeli legal response.

Information Security Obligations Under Israeli Law

The principal legal framework for protecting personal information in Israel is the Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, and the Protection of Privacy Regulations (Data Security), 5777-2017. The Regulations require organizational and technological security measures for databases; a general statement by the database controller that it protects customers’ privacy is not enough. The requirements also apply to databases that are not required to be registered. Accordingly, the fact that a business has no obligation to register its customer database does not exempt it from information security duties.

Amendment No. 13 to the Protection of Privacy Law, which entered into force on 14 August 2025, changed statutory definitions, reduced the scope of mandatory database registration, introduced additional obligations and expanded the Privacy Protection Authority’s enforcement powers. Applying the Regulations requires consideration of the current definitions of a database and personal information rather than reliance on the former registration criteria. Personal information may be held in customer management systems, employee files, service platforms, user databases and cloud systems. Business information that is not personal information may nonetheless be protected under contracts, trade secret law and other duties, even where the Data Security Regulations do not apply to it by reason of its content.

Security requirements are distinct from obligations to notify individuals, use information for permitted purposes and respect rights of access and correction. These matters are addressed separately in the context of privacy notices. The practical distinction is that a privacy policy describes how information is used, whereas the Data Security Regulations require an assessment of how it is actually protected.

How the Security Level Determines an Organization’s Obligations

The Regulations distinguish between databases subject to basic, medium and high security levels, and include special provisions for databases managed by an individual where the applicable conditions are met. Classification is not based merely on the IT manager’s perception of risk. The database’s purposes, the categories of information it contains, the characteristics of its controller, the volume of information and the number of people authorized to access it must be examined under the schedules to the Regulations. A database containing sensitive information on many customers may be subject to different duties from a small database containing business contact details.

Regulation 2 requires a database specifications document describing, among other things, the purposes of using the information, the types of information, transfers outside Israel and principal security risks. Regulation 4 requires an information security procedure. Other provisions address mapping of systems, access permissions, user identification, access monitoring, physical security, communications and outsourcing. Merely having a document and a procedure does not demonstrate compliance if actual system permissions differ from those specified on paper.

For databases subject to medium or high security requirements, Regulation 16 generally requires an internal or external audit at least once every 24 months. At the high security level, Regulation 5 also requires risk surveys and penetration testing at the prescribed intervals, generally at least once every 18 months. Deficiencies identified by those assessments must be addressed; leaving a report without follow-up does not satisfy the duty of oversight. For an official explanation in English, see the Israeli Privacy Protection Authority’s overview of the Data Security Regulations.

Legal and Organizational Preparation Before a Cyber Incident

An organization whose information is held by several service providers needs to know who can access each system, who is permitted to copy data and who has authority to shut down a system in an emergency. Role-based permissions, withdrawal of access when an employee leaves, authentication mechanisms and access controls are not merely accepted security practices; they are addressed expressly in the Regulations in relation to databases. For databases at the relevant security levels, access logs and retention of security records for the periods prescribed by law are also required.

An incident response procedure should specify who receives the initial report, who can order the disconnection of systems or restoration of data, how system logs will be preserved and who decides whether a regulator must be notified. Regulation 11 requires the documentation of security incidents and the inclusion of incident response provisions in the security procedure. For databases subject to medium security requirements, security incidents must be reviewed at least annually; at the high security level, a review must take place at least quarterly to consider whether the procedures need updating.

The information security officer and the data protection officer must also be distinguished. These are separate roles, and the legal sources of the appointment requirements and their powers are not identical. Amendment No. 13 introduced an obligation to appoint a data protection officer for certain bodies specified in the law, not for every business in Israel. An organization required to appoint an officer should define the officer’s working relationship with management, technical personnel and legal counsel, without assuming that the appointment transfers responsibility for legal compliance away from the organization.

When Does a Cyberattack Qualify as an Information Security Incident?

A cyber incident may involve stolen credentials, impersonation, file encryption, website defacement, data exfiltration or disruption of service. The Data Security Regulations define a security incident by reference to harm to the integrity of information or use of information without authorization or beyond the authorization granted. The legal question is not whether an incident was called a “cyberattack” in an investigation report, but what happened to the information in the database and to the systems through which it can be accessed.

For example, where an employee was authorized to view customer details to process orders but downloaded them for personal use, a question of use beyond authorization may arise even without an external intrusion. Where ransomware encrypted information and made it inaccessible, the Privacy Protection Authority considers that this may constitute harm to data integrity, even when there is not yet evidence that a copy was taken outside the organization. Conversely, a blocked intrusion attempt that did not provide access to information does not automatically amount to a severe security incident requiring notification.

Classification of the incident therefore requires determining which databases were affected, their applicable security levels, what access permissions were exploited, whether personal information was exposed or copied and whether its integrity was compromised. Uncertainty as to the full scope of the intrusion does not justify assuming that no reporting duty arose, particularly where a high-security database is involved.

Immediate Steps Following Discovery of a Cyber Incident

The initial response must combine containment with preservation of the ability to establish what happened. Disconnecting an affected server, blocking an account or changing passwords may be essential, but deleting files or reinstalling systems without preserving evidence may destroy material needed to identify the attacker, determine the extent of exposure or pursue later legal proceedings. The organization should record when the incident was identified, what actions were taken, who authorized them and what information was available to each decision-maker.

Where cloud providers, incident response companies or cyber insurers are involved, the organization should promptly establish who holds the logs and access records, how long they are retained and who can demand their preservation. A technical report prepared to determine the facts does not automatically become legally privileged merely because a lawyer participated in commissioning it. The purposes of the investigation, the method of documenting it and the transmission of findings should be arranged in advance.

In a ransomware attack, the perpetrators may demand payment in return for a decryption key or a promise not to publish information. Payment does not guarantee deletion of the information or prevent its further use. Before deciding, the organization should examine, so far as possible, the recipient of the payment, any legal restrictions relevant to making it, insurance conditions, the possibility of restoring systems and the implications for preserving evidence.

Reporting to Israel’s Privacy Protection Authority and Notifying Data Subjects

Regulation 11(d)(1) requires immediate notification to the Israeli Privacy Protection Authority (PPA) of a severe security incident affecting a database subject to medium or high security requirements, together with a report on the steps taken in response. The notification obligation applies to the database controller and the database holder, in accordance with the Regulations. Under the Authority’s interpretation, a report by one of them concerning the same incident satisfies their shared reporting obligation, but does not release the others from dealing with the incident or fulfilling their remaining duties.

The reporting threshold depends on the applicable security level. For a medium-security database, it concerns, among other things, unauthorized use of a substantial part of the database or harm to the integrity of a substantial part of its information. The threshold is stricter for a high-security database: according to the Authority’s interpretation, unauthorized entry into database systems that gives access to the information may require reporting even before there is proof that information was actually copied or disclosed. The Authority’s guidance on severe security incidents explains these distinctions and provides examples.

Israeli law does not impose a universal 72-hour notification period on all organizations. Where Regulation 11 requires reporting, the obligation is to report immediately. The initial notice may state the facts known at that stage, with additional information supplied as the investigation progresses. Waiting for a final forensic report may be inconsistent with the duty. Reporting the same event to the police or the Israel National Cyber Directorate does not replace the notification required by the Privacy Protection Authority.

There is no blanket obligation to notify every individual whose information might have been exposed after every incident. Under Regulation 11(d)(2), the Authority may, subject to the stated conditions, direct that individuals who may be harmed be notified. Notification obligations may also arise under a customer contract, requirements of a sector-specific regulator or foreign law applicable to the activity. It is therefore necessary to distinguish a report to the Authority, notification of data subjects and updates to business customers, and to avoid unsupported public statements describing a data leak that has not yet been established.

The Israel National Cyber Directorate also operates a separate reporting channel through its national cyber emergency response team (CERT), providing initial professional assistance. This is distinct from reporting under the Data Security Regulations. Additional mandatory reporting duties may apply to organizations in regulated sectors and to suppliers subject to specific legislation.

Responsibility of Software Providers, Cloud Services and Outsourcing Contractors

Moving a database to a hosting provider or placing a SaaS system in the hands of an external contractor does not remove that information from the legal obligations of its controller. Regulation 15 requires an assessment of the information security risks associated with engaging an external provider and contractual arrangements covering specified matters. These include the information and systems the provider may access, the purposes of processing, the treatment of information at the end of the engagement, obligations of persons authorized to access the information on the provider’s behalf and arrangements concerning subcontractors.

The Regulations also require reporting and monitoring mechanisms concerning the provider. The agreement must address notification of security incidents, periodic reporting on compliance with obligations and oversight measures available to the database controller. A commercial agreement should also set a short deadline for initial notice of a suspected incident, require preservation of logs and cooperation in forensic investigations, and allocate restoration costs and responsibility for claims by affected individuals. Not every one of these contractual provisions is expressly required by the Regulations, but without them the database controller may struggle to fulfill its duties in real time.

If a cloud provider reports a breach of its hosting environment, its business customer cannot simply refer to the contract and insist that the provider “handle” the incident. The customer must determine what information relating to its own customers was exposed, which permissions were used and how its database is classified for reporting purposes.

Unauthorized Computer Access, Data Theft and Trade Secrets

A cyber incident may give rise to claims against a person who accessed a computer without authorization or used information taken from it, even where no personal information was exposed. Sections 4 and 5 of Israel’s Computers Law, 5755-1995, deal with unlawful access to computer material and access carried out to commit another offence. In State of Israel v. Ezra, Criminal Leave to Appeal 8464/14 and 8617/14 (15 December 2015), the Israeli Supreme Court held that unlawful access is not limited to sophisticated technical hacking and that accessing a computer using login credentials obtained unlawfully may fall within the prohibition.

Taking business information may also constitute trade secret misappropriation under Sections 5 and 6 of the Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999. Protection requires proof that the information is not generally known, that its secrecy gives a business advantage and that reasonable measures were taken to preserve it. In Gamida v. Fisher, Civil Case 2117/07 (Tel Aviv–Jaffa District Court, 5 December 2012), a company was held liable after receiving business information extracted from a competitor’s computers through a former employee. The court emphasized the recipient’s involvement and the protection available to trade secrets even though the owner’s security measures were not all optimal.

In Korea Motors Israel Ltd. v. Avraham Unger, Civil Cases 2262/08 and 8781-07-13 (Tel Aviv–Jaffa District Court, 10 March 2021), the court examined the use of materials obtained by hacking into computers in the context of a commercial dispute. Damages were awarded for misappropriation of trade secrets and invasion of privacy, together with injunctions prohibiting use of copied materials. These decisions illustrate the distinction between weaknesses in the information owner’s internal security and the separate responsibility of a party who takes or exploits information by unlawful means.

Regulatory Enforcement and Civil Claims Following a Security Failure

A security incident does not by itself establish that an organization breached the law. Liability depends on the measures the organization was required to implement before the incident, their actual implementation, how earlier warnings were handled, the performance of service providers and compliance with reporting duties. The Data Security Regulations impose obligations whose breach may be examined even where no customer has proved financial loss. Amendment No. 13 expanded the Authority’s financial sanctions regime and enforcement powers, including in relation to failure to report a severe security incident immediately.

Civil liability may arise under privacy law, negligence, breach of statutory duty or breach of contract, depending on the elements of each claim. Where a business customer alleges that a software provider caused a data leak, the analysis should address the service level promised, contractual information security provisions, allocation of administrative permissions and causation between the alleged breach and the loss. A class action may raise further questions concerning the claimant’s individual cause of action, the existence of a class and the conditions for certification.

Cyber insurance may cover some of the costs of incident response, restoration and litigation, subject to the terms of the policy. Decisions taken immediately after an incident should account for notification requirements owed to the insurer, conditions governing the engagement of investigators and security professionals, and provisions concerning settlement or payment. Compliance with regulatory duties does not depend on whether insurance coverage is available.

Legal Follow-Up After the Incident Has Been Contained

Once operations resume, closing the technical incident must be distinguished from completing the legal investigation. The organization should collect access records, timelines, forensic findings and records of decisions; identify customers, employees and suppliers who may be affected; and complete notifications and updates required by law or contract. If the incident resulted from excessive permissions or inadequate oversight of a supplier, the response requires actual changes to systems and contractual arrangements, not merely a revision of written procedures.

Where business information is known or suspected to have been copied by a former employee or competitor, preserving the evidence may be essential to a claim, an application for an injunction or a request for orders protecting evidence. Where personal information is affected, documentation of the investigation and the steps taken is also needed in dealings with the Privacy Protection Authority. If both personal and commercial information are involved, different legal proceedings and remedies may need to be pursued in parallel.

International businesses dealing with a cyber incident involving Israeli operations or personal information, and foreign law firms requiring local counsel for regulatory reporting, investigation, contractual disputes or related litigation in Israel, may contact Drori Stav at office@dwo.co.il.

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