On January 20, 2026, the Supreme Court of Israel dismissed Antipod Investments Ltd.’s application for leave to appeal the refusal to register the word mark “Jerusalem Winery”. In LCA 49352-07-25, Antipod Investments Ltd. v. Registrar of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, Justice Yechiel Kasher held that the dispute concerned the application of established legal tests for acquired distinctiveness to the evidence presented, rather than a question of general legal importance warranting a third-instance appeal. The application was dismissed, and Antipod was ordered to pay costs of NIS 7,500.
The decision left undisturbed the Jerusalem District Court’s judgment of May 20, 2025, which dismissed an appeal against the Deputy Trademark Registrar’s refusal to register the mark. While the District Court examined the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to establish acquired distinctiveness, the Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the limits of judicial review in third-instance proceedings.
Background: An Application to Register “Jerusalem Winery” as a Word Mark
Antipod operates a winery in Jerusalem and markets wines under the Jerusalem Winery brand. The company owns two registered stylized trademarks, Nos. 287348 and 342791, incorporating the words “Jerusalem Winery” alongside graphic elements and additional wording.
On October 25, 2021, Antipod filed Trademark Application No. 344824, seeking registration of the words “Jerusalem Winery” alone, without any accompanying design elements, for grape juice, wines and beverages in Classes 32 and 33.
The Israel Trademark Department considered “Jerusalem” to be a geographical designation and “Winery” to be a descriptive term identifying the nature of the business. Accordingly, registration required evidence that the combination, despite its descriptive character, had acquired a secondary meaning identifying Antipod as the commercial source of the relevant goods, under Sections 8 and 11(11) of the Israeli Trademarks Ordinance.
Evidence Examined by the Deputy Registrar and the District Court
Antipod submitted promotional materials, marketing data, affidavits, foreign trademark registrations and survey evidence intended to demonstrate recognition of the brand.
Deputy Registrar Jacqueline Bracha, acting as an intellectual property adjudicator, concluded that the evidence did not establish acquired distinctiveness in the word mark for which registration was sought.
Among other findings, the Deputy Registrar observed that the mark appeared on wine bottles and in promotional materials as part of stylized trademarks, rather than as the words alone. The survey examined awareness among wine shop owners instead of wine consumers. Registrations in other jurisdictions, as well as registrations of other geographically descriptive marks in Israel, were not determinative of the application under examination.
On May 20, 2025, Justice Arie Romanov of the Jerusalem District Court dismissed Antipod’s appeal in Civil Appeal 68128-03-23. The Court found no grounds to interfere with the Deputy Registrar’s assessment of the evidence, which fell within her professional expertise.
For a detailed examination of the evidence, including the survey methodology and the distinction between word marks and stylized marks, see Antipod v. Trademark Registrar – Jerusalem Winery and Acquired Distinctiveness (District Court 2025).
Antipod’s Arguments Before the Supreme Court
In its application for leave to appeal, Antipod identified three questions which, in its view, extended beyond the circumstances of the particular dispute.
The first concerned the evidentiary burden applicable to the establishment of acquired distinctiveness. The second involved alleged unequal treatment compared with other trademarks incorporating geographical elements that had been registered in Israel. The third concerned the District Court’s adoption of the Deputy Registrar’s findings without extensively reconsidering each of the company’s arguments.
Antipod further argued that allowing the previous decisions to stand would result in a miscarriage of justice. It maintained that the evidence demonstrated substantial goodwill and established that consumers associated the words “Jerusalem Winery” with its products.
The Registrar responded that the dispute concerned the assessment and weight of evidence under established legal principles, and therefore did not justify a further appeal.
When Will the Supreme Court Grant Leave to Appeal a Trademark Registrar’s Decision?
Justice Kasher reiterated the established principle that leave to appeal in a third-instance proceeding is granted only in exceptional circumstances.
Such leave may be justified where the case raises a legal question of general importance extending beyond the parties’ individual interests, or where refusing leave would result in a miscarriage of justice.
The same standard applies where the proceedings originate from a decision of the Registrar of Patents, Designs and Trademarks. In this context, the professional expertise of the Registrar in trademark registration matters is also relevant.
The Supreme Court did not regard the proceedings as an opportunity to re-examine every affidavit, advertisement or survey finding submitted by Antipod.
The relevant question was whether the dispute justified an additional level of judicial review after the specialized administrative authority had decided the matter and the District Court had examined its decision.
The Spectrum of Descriptiveness and the Burden of Proving Acquired Distinctiveness
A central aspect of the Supreme Court’s reasoning was the distinction between a dispute over the applicable legal test and a dispute over the application of that test to the evidence.
Antipod did not dispute that the proposed word mark could not be registered without proof of acquired distinctiveness. Nor did it challenge the principle that the burden of proof rested on the applicant or that the degree of proof required depended on the mark’s position along the spectrum of descriptiveness, ranging from generic expressions to fanciful marks.
Indeed, Antipod accepted that the evidentiary burden in its case was particularly demanding.
Its argument was that it had successfully discharged that burden and that both the Deputy Registrar and the District Court had erred in concluding otherwise.
The Supreme Court held that this was precisely a factual and evidentiary disagreement concerning the particular circumstances of the case, rather than a new legal question about how the applicable burden should be determined.
The decision should therefore not be understood as establishing that a combination of a geographical name and a term describing a business can never be registered as a trademark.
Rather, it confirms that registration requires proof of acquired distinctiveness and that an applicant seeking to challenge the assessment of evidence after two previous determinations faces a significant procedural obstacle.
The distinction between inherent and acquired distinctiveness, and the evidentiary requirements applicable to descriptive marks, are further examined in the context of trademark registrability under Israeli law.
Do Registrations of Other Geographical Trademarks Establish Discrimination?
Antipod argued that the refusal of its application was inconsistent with the registration of other trademarks incorporating geographical designations.
Justice Kasher rejected the contention that this argument raised a general question of discriminatory treatment justifying a third-instance appeal.
Both the Deputy Registrar and the District Court had addressed the argument by reference to differences in the circumstances and evidentiary foundations of the respective applications.
The existence of another registered trademark containing a geographical term does not replace the need to establish how the relevant public perceives the particular mark for which registration is sought.
An applicant must demonstrate that its own mark has acquired the necessary distinctiveness, rather than rely solely on the registration of other marks.
Must the District Court Reconsider Every Argument Raised on Appeal?
Antipod also contended that the District Court had adopted the Deputy Registrar’s decision without sufficiently addressing each of its objections.
The Supreme Court clarified that a court’s decision to adopt the findings of a specialized adjudicative authority, without separately and extensively reconsidering every argument, does not by itself constitute a miscarriage of justice warranting a third-instance appeal.
The District Court had examined the Deputy Registrar’s decision and the parties’ submissions and concluded that intervention was unwarranted.
Justice Kasher found no defect in that approach in the circumstances of the proceedings.
Accordingly, an application for leave to appeal could not be used as an additional opportunity to relitigate evidentiary arguments that had already been considered.
Outcome and Practical Implications for Trademark Registration in Israel
On January 20, 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal in LCA 49352-07-25 and ordered Antipod to pay the Registrar NIS 7,500 in costs.
The Supreme Court did not grant leave and proceed to determine a further appeal on its merits, nor did it establish a new legal test for acquired distinctiveness.
The earlier decisions, which found that Antipod had failed to establish the registrability of “Jerusalem Winery” as a word mark, therefore remained in effect.
The practical significance of the decision lies in the importance of assembling appropriate evidence at the initial examination stage when seeking registration of a geographical or descriptive expression.
Such evidence should address the actual use of the precise mark for which registration is sought, its exposure to the relevant consumers, and the extent to which those consumers associate the mark with a single commercial source.
Evidence of goodwill associated with a stylized logo or a broader brand identity may not be sufficient to establish acquired distinctiveness in the words alone.
Once the matter reaches the appellate stage, and particularly where leave for a third-instance appeal is required, it becomes considerably more difficult to transform a disagreement over the evaluation of evidence into a question of general legal importance.
For a detailed analysis of the underlying evidentiary findings, see the District Court judgment in Antipod v. Trademark Registrar (2025). Further information about the registration process and legal representation before the Israel Trademark Office is available on the firm’s Trademark Registration and Prosecution in Israel practice page.
